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The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and 
Beyond  
Chandra Lekha Sriram, Marie-Joëlle Zahar 
Abstract: The purpose of international conflict-resolution efforts is, in the 
short term, to bring an end to violent armed conflict, and, in the medium to 
longer term, to prevent the revival of conflict. However, at least one of the 
mechanisms often utilised in conflict resolution and peace agreements, 
power-sharing, may not only prove problematic in early negotiation and 
implementation, but may potentially be at odds with the longer-term goal of 
preventing resurgence of conflict. Why might this be the case? Longer-term 
peacebuilding seeks to prevent conflict in part by building strong and sus-
tainable states. Such states should be able to avoid reverting to armed con-
flict because they would be more responsive to grievances and more effec-
tive in dealing with violent dissent. However, power-sharing arrangements 
may undermine such efforts by placing in power individuals and groups not 
fully committed to, or unable to take part in, governance for the benefit of 
the entire populace; in part because it necessarily places in power those who 
have engaged in significant violence to achieve their ends. This is likely to 
create less democratic states, although we do not insist that democracy is or 
should be the only goal of peacebuilders. Rather, we suggest that power-
sharing arrangements may tend not only towards undemocratic states, but 
towards states which are not responsive to the needs of the citizenry for 
security in ways which may undermine human security and state legitimacy. 
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The purpose of international conflict-resolution efforts is, in the short term, 
to bring an end to violent armed conflict, and in the medium to longer term 
to prevent the revival of conflict. However, at least one of the mechanisms 
often utilised in conflict resolution and peace agreements, power-sharing, 
may not only prove problematic in early negotiation and implementation, 
but may potentially be at odds with the longer-term goal of preventing re-
surgence of conflict. When and why might this be the case? Longer-term 
peacebuilding seeks to prevent conflict in part by building strong and sus-
tainable states. Such states should be able to avoid reverting to armed con-
flict because they would be more responsive to grievances and more effec-
tive in dealing with violent dissent. However, power-sharing arrangements 
may undermine such efforts by placing in power individuals and groups not 
fully committed to, or unable to take part in, governance for the benefit of 
the entire populace; in part because it necessarily places in power those who 
have engaged in significant violence to achieve their ends (Mehler 2009). 
This is likely to create less democratic states, although we do not insist that 
democracy is or should be the only goal of peacebuilders; we simply assert 
that, although many see democracy as the ultimate guarantee of sustainable 
peace, power-sharing arrangements often tend to result in undemocratic 
states. We suggest that power-sharing arrangements may tend not only to-
wards undemocratic states, but towards states which are not responsive to 
the needs of the citizenry for security in ways which may undermine human 
security and state legitimacy.  
Power-sharing arrangements are commonly built into peace agreements 
to provide critical assurances to negotiating parties and induce them to sign 
and implement them. Such arrangements seek to provide incentives for 
warring parties to remain committed to the peace process and to assuage 
their security concerns. Despite the frequency of their usage, the efficacy 
and durability of power-sharing arrangements vary greatly. Indeed, while 
power-sharing has provided stability for Switzerland, similar arrangements 
have failed to prevent Lebanon from descending into civil war.1 Further-
more, even when power-sharing arrangements may help to assure parties in 
the short run, they are not designed necessarily to create robust, sustainable, 
non-violent states in the longer run.  
                                                 
1  Our focus here is power-sharing arrangements in peace agreements specifically, not 
those which have solely been written into legislation or the constitution, or which 
emerge from political transitions, as in, variously, Belgium, Switzerland, and South 
Africa. Hence, for example, the 1943 power-sharing arrangement that accompanied 
Lebanon’s accession to independence falls outside the purview of this article; the 
1989 modification of this arrangement which was negotiated at Ta’if to bring the 
Lebanese civil war to an end falls in the universe of our cases. 
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In spite of the diversity of settings in which power-sharing arrange-
ments have been put in place, three key factors seem to affect their ability to 
ensure a sustainable transition from war to peace and, subsequently, to pro-
vide a framework for the conduct of democratic politics: the nature of the 
state – more specifically the extent of its centralisation and/or repressive 
power; the capacities and interests of armed group(s) involved in, and ex-
cluded from, the agreement; and the nature and/or robustness of the in-
volvement of external actors in either supporting or undermining the 
agreement.  
In many instances, such factors converge to create situations not only 
unfavourable to the success of power-sharing arrangements, but in which 
such arrangements create new risks. These include the creation of new 
grievances and perverse incentives, the risk of importing conflictual behav-
iour into weak state institutions which are unable to manage them, and al-
ternatively including new participants in governance who lack the back-
ground and capacity to function properly, or who may be sidelined by em-
bedded political and bureaucratic practices. These risks, and their conse-
quences, often result in a situation where the short-term reliance on power-
sharing runs at odds with the long-term objective of creating robust, sus-
tainable, non-violent states.  
In this article, we argue that the risks associated with power-sharing ar-
rangements are particularly acute in the context of weak or collapsed states 
such as exist in the African context. In conflict-affected countries, the new 
grievances and perverse incentives often associated with power-sharing 
further decrease the state’s ability to effectively deter and assure (Saideman 
and Zahar 2009). States whose institutions cannot easily accommodate the 
grievances of new players (assurance) will often fall back on (more or less 
violent) methods of exclusion which, in turn, increase the potential for the 
emergence of violent challenges. And states that cannot effectively wield the 
threat of legitimate violence (deterrence) are ill-equipped to address these 
challenges. In other terms, in such conditions, power-sharing arrangements 
might in fact speed the decline of the state. In this article, we elaborate on 
these challenges with illustrative lessons from a number of African states 
that have been the sites of power-sharing arrangements, including Burundi, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. While African states have been the 
subject of an unprecedented range and number of peacemaking and peace-
building experiments that involve power-sharing, this is not only a risk in 
power-sharing arrangements in Africa; our argument is founded on broader 
comparative analysis of such arrangements in Bosnia, Nepal, Colombia, 
Lebanon, and elsewhere (Sriram 2008). Based in part on the results of earlier 
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in-depth research of a number of power-sharing agreements (Sriram 2008, 
2010; Zahar 2005 a and b, 2009 a and b), and using our findings inductively 
to look at other cases and develop theoretical propositions, this study is a 
first step for future research by ourselves and others. As such, it utilises a 
wide range of comparative examples rather than large-N analyses or a num-
ber of in-depth case studies. This enables us to develop a number of theo-
retical critiques and analytic categories which may be tested in subsequent 
research. 
Why Power-Sharing? 
It is important to understand power-sharing in context. In particular, one 
must understand the impetus behind it and other incentives used to address 
the vulnerability that groups may feel in disarming as part of the peace proc-
ess, as well as the rationale for including power-sharing arrangements in 
peace agreements, and the purported process by which such institutional 
arrangements are to prevent conflict renewal. We recognise that many of the 
short- and medium-term impediments to the negotiation and implementa-
tion of power-sharing arrangements may also be impediments to other 
peace agreements. However, the particular ways in which power-sharing 
arrangements may therefore fail is specific to their provisions. Furthermore, 
power-sharing has become one of the most frequently adopted approaches 
to ending civil war. Therefore, a separate analysis of challenges to such 
agreements, distinct from other types of peace agreements, is important. 
Security, Peace Agreements, and Peace Implementation 
Power-sharing incentives are but one set of tools through which the inter-
national community and third-party mediators may facilitate negotiations. 
Although the presence of strong third-party guarantors may help to prevent 
cheating, often such guarantors are not available (Walter 1997, 1999). Thus, 
parties to peace negotiations face a security dilemma. They require reassur-
ance that, should they negotiate and compromise, their security and survival 
will not also be compromised (Snyder and Jervis 1999; Posen 1993; Hartzell, 
Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Collins 1998). While the parties to an internal 
armed conflict might in principle become more secure by negotiating and 
disarming, each fears the defection of the others, and the high costs of being 
unprepared for surprise attacks. Similar concerns were often cited by ana-
lysts of Northern Ireland as one of the main stumbling blocks to the full 
decommissioning of the Irish Republican Army without which the Unionists 
refused to implement power-sharing provisions. Yet negotiating and imple-
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menting a peace agreement generally requires that one or more parties give 
up their means of self-defense, while still occupying the same territorial 
space as their adversaries (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003: 315; Walter 2001). If 
each party fears being disadvantaged or even destroyed, it may become very 
difficult to achieve agreement on sensitive security issues such as disarma-
ment and, more generally, to achieve agreement on future power structures 
(Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001). It is for this reason, according to 
many scholars, that power-sharing and third-party guarantors are so impor-
tant for peace processes, as they lessen the fear and costs of defection, in the 
short term, and institutionalise a balance among mistrustful parties in the 
longer term (Walter 2002; Sisk 1996). 
Peace negotiations and agreements seek not only to address the original 
sources of conflict, and grievances that may have developed over the course 
of the conflict, but also the acute security concerns of the key parties, par-
ticularly, although not only, nonstate armed groups (Walter 2001: 129; Wal-
ter 1997: 340). While failure to alleviate security concerns is not the sole 
reason that peace negotiations and implementation may break down, it is a 
critical one, because, according to peace agreements, parties that were previ-
ously at odds are expected not only to risk disarming, in whole or in part, 
and therefore risk their survival, but also to work together, or at least to 
peacefully coexist, in a postconflict (usually) unitary state. Such a state would 
generally not only have a monopoly over the use of force, but would also 
have primary decisionmaking power over the distribution of political and 
economic resources. Thus armed groups will want to ensure that their inter-
ests are protected, and that the resources of the state are not used against 
them (Hartzell 1999: 5; Weber 1946: 78). Commitments to cooperate and 
disarm must be credible, and institutional protection through power-sharing 
is only one tool to increase credibility. As we shall see, external guarantors 
and institutional design are thought to be credible because they can impose 
costs on possible defectors. 
The presence or absence of third-party guarantees, while not the pri-
mary focus here, is an important intervening factor in the success or failure 
of the arrangements examined in this article. The nature and extent of third-
party involvement can of course vary significantly. The presence of a third-
party guarantor may only ensure compliance during a transitional period, but 
it may also mask the real intent of parties who comply just to satisfy external 
actors. If this is the case, behaviour is likely to change once external actors 
leave, and long-term implementation and peace consolidation may be less 
successful (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003: 316). 
Equally important, third-party guarantees are not always available, and 
parties to a conflict, as well as the mediators, may have little capacity to 
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induce such guarantees. The experience of international involvement in and 
support for the Bicesse Accords in Angola is a case in point (Angstee 1993). 
In many instances, agreements will be negotiated and may even be imple-
mented in the absence of third-party guarantees. Given the mistrust between 
the parties and the security dilemma described above, the agreement may be 
designed to lock in certain protections for each of the parties, particularly 
through power-sharing, which is believed to help to support stable peace-
building in its medium to long term. While much of the literature focuses 
only on the political dimensions of power-sharing – as sharing of access to 
political power through electoral arrangements, appointments, or secured 
civil service posts – we treat power-sharing as having four dimensions. 
These are sharing of control over or access to benefits of: security, territory, 
politics, and economic resources. Before addressing these dimensions, it is 
important to discuss the rationale for including power-sharing arrangements 
in peace agreements, and the purported link between such arrangements and 
conflict renewal. 
Power-Sharing as a Solution to Internal Conflict 
Much has been written about the use of power-sharing as a tool to mitigate 
or prevent conflict in ethnic, plural, or divided societies. Indeed, Ted Gurr 
includes power- and resource-sharing as part of what he terms an emerging 
“doctrine” in the international practice of managing conflicts. Such political 
arrangements are expected to ensure that grievances that could promote 
conflict are addressed through nonviolent means (Gurr 2002: 28; Fayemi 
2006: 171). While power-sharing solutions and theories emerge from work 
on ethnically divided societies (McGarry and O’Leary 1998), in this article 
we examine the use of power-sharing in both ethnic and non-ethnic con-
flicts. However, it is worthwhile to first examine the reasons why power-
sharing is generally thought to be a useful tool in ethnic or identity conflicts. 
The case was first cogently made in Arend Lijphart’s Democracy in Plural 
Societies (1997). Though Lijphart’s work focussed on mitigating tensions in 
democratic societies, his analysis remains relevant even for undemocratic 
societies emerging from conflict. Specifically, the consociational arrange-
ments he advocates may help to mitigate risks of conflict, because decisions 
are taken by consensus, which may help to prevent majorities from control-
ling minorities (Mukherjee 2006; Schneckener 2002: 204-5). 
Dealing with the demands of plural rival groups is clearly a challenge in 
democratic societies, but it is obviously a far greater challenge where groups 
have engaged in armed conflict. This is true whether the conflict is based on 
ethnic rivalries or not. Peace processes and transitions are often more un-
stable and insecure than even the preceding periods of conflict, in situations 
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where fighting may have reached a stalemate. Indeed, transitions may pro-
voke the fears and insecurities that helped to spark and maintain conflict 
initially – the fear that if a party makes any concessions, the adversary will 
take advantage of them. As a result, both governments and armed groups 
are often wary of making concessions, and in particular of laying down arms, 
unless they believe that their own interests will be protected in any new 
institutional arrangements. Parties thus need, and negotiations often result 
in, confidence-building measures such as power-sharing. In general, power-
sharing is thought to offer parties institutionalised insurance that they will 
not face future policies that are discriminatory, retributive, or otherwise 
harmful to their interests.2 At the same time, it has increasingly been 
acknowledged that while these tools have their merits, they also have their 
limits (O’Flynn and Russell 2005; Roeder and Rothchild 2005), which we 
will elaborate upon throughout this article.  
Power-sharing arrangements in peace agreements include at least one 
of four dimensions – security, territory, politics, and economics – with many 
processes involving more than one (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Sriram 
2008). Each of these is thought to be particularly helpful in addressing spe-
cific past grievances and subsequent concerns over the future. Political 
power-sharing, or the allocation of specific posts in government or specific 
proportions in the executive, legislature, or judiciary, is but one type of 
power-sharing. Power-sharing in the security realm is specifically geared to 
reassuring groups that have experienced violence or repression at the hands 
of the state and its agents. Groups that experience repression are particularly 
likely to eventually decide to take up arms; in the absence of reassurance 
they may be wary of laying those arms down. Territorial autonomy has his-
torically been used to address the self-determination demands of minorities 
that are both ethnically, linguistically or religiously distinct from the rest of 
the country and geographically concentrated (Lapidoth 1996). Economic 
power-sharing is often used where discrimination has resulted in differential 
distribution of state resources, and economic development among the vari-
ous regions of a country, and particularly where grievances over maldis-
tribution of resources have generated conflict. We do not explore in detail 
here specifics of the four types of power-sharing, which have been discussed 
sufficiently in the literature. However, as becomes evident in our discussions 
of short-, medium-, and long-term challenges for power-sharing arrange-
ments further below, each specific type may face particular unique chal-
lenges, and indeed in some circumstances different types may offer different 
                                                 
2  These are not the only reasons put forth for institutional reform. A recent World 
Bank study concluded that improvement in institutions reduced the risk of civil war 
(Djankov and Reynal-Querol 2007).  
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incentives for key players and even work against one another. Their capacity 
to function effectively may also be affected by the three contextual factors 
we discuss next. Thus, for example, governance or political power-sharing 
incentives may prove difficult to implement where an armed group is insuf-
ficiently capable of operating in competitive politics or complex bureaucra-
cies, or where the state apparatus is successfully resistant to the incorpora-
tion of armed groups. At the same time, political or security power-sharing 
provisions may be less appealing where there is a real prospect for territorial 
autonomy or independence. 
The Context of Power-Sharing: Three Factors 
There are, as discussed at the outset, three key factors which may affect the 
creation and implementation of power-sharing arrangements and their dura-
bility: the nature of the state, the nature of the armed group(s), and the de-
gree of third-party engagement. The first has not been sufficiently discussed 
in the power-sharing literature, ironically despite the centrality of the state to 
conflict resolution efforts and in particular to the institutional bargains of-
fered through power-sharing. The second has been mostly discussed from 
the perspective of spoiling, or the danger posed by armed groups to the 
negotiation and early implementation stages of the process (Stedman 1997); 
while the third has been covered most extensively. 
First, the nature of the state is critical. In particular, two dimensions 
have empirically emerged as particularly relevant for our purposes. The first 
is the extent of state centralisation or the state’s relative ability to project 
power beyond the capital city. This is particularly relevant in the African 
context where, as Jeffrey Herbst (2000) has thoughtfully argued, the state is 
often absent the further one moves away from the center. The second is the 
state’s repressive capacity. As was cogently argued by Nazih Ayyubi in a 
study of Arab regimes (1996), and more broadly illustrated by the history of 
the former Soviet Union, states may be able to function for a long time with 
very little internal legitimacy as long as they maintain effective control over 
their security forces thus making rebellion prohibitive. Where the state’s 
reach and repressive capacity are strong, conflicts are unlikely to erupt. The 
very nature of the state’s repressive capacity might need further unpacking. 
For example, if the military is not subject to civilian rule, or has been an 
autonomous political player, it might resist or alter changes outlined in 
power-sharing deals (Chinchilla 2008). 
Where the state’s reach and/or repressive capacity are weak, there may 
be an increased likelihood of internal conflict and subsequent power-sharing 
arrangements. Where a state and state institutions have been quite weak, the 
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burden of power-sharing arrangements can be more than they can bear in 
the immediate post-conflict period. As a set of rules and institutions in-
tended to frame the behaviour of formerly warring factions in such a way as 
to prevent the recurrence of violence, power-sharing is only as efficient as 
the capacity of state institutions to enforce the rules and punish would-be 
transgressors. The weaker the institutions intended to function as the 
guardians of the system, the less likely it is that they will have the capacity to 
perform their monitoring and enforcing functions properly, and the less 
likely that they can accommodate the destabilising effects of competition for 
primacy between former enemies within them. Alternatively, a state might 
be relatively centralised, strong and repressive. A repressive state might have 
the power to prevent cheating by partners, but it might equally be able to 
abandon its own commitments to its power-sharing partners, or formally 
adhere to them while resisting any genuine participation. In such instances, 
the efficiency and durability of power-sharing might depend almost exclu-
sively on the ruling group’s willingness to abide by its commitments. 
Second, the nature and interests of the armed group(s) may be impor-
tant. This is not to recapitulate the spoilers debate, but rather to make a 
different point. We seek to draw attention to another dimension of the poli-
tics of non-state armed actors: the way in which the intersection between 
their objectives and their level of institutionalisation may either facilitate or 
hinder the transition from war to peace. Insurgents who pursue political 
agendas and seek to either participate in or replace incumbent governments 
are more likely to develop proto-state structures (Zahar 2000). Some even 
develop into fully-fledged quasi-states, such as Abkhazia and Nagorno-Kara-
bagh. But, in many instances, armed groups may have no experience or 
expertise in governance, and find it difficult to engage, particularly if the 
state structures and officials resist or undermine their participation. The 
lower the level of group institutionalisation and previous experience with 
governance, the more difficult they will find it to function within the often 
complex maze of rules and institutions that make up contemporary power-
sharing arrangements. Former rebels turned politicians sometimes need to 
be trained in the most basic functions such as their role as parliamentarians 
or the fundamentals of the legislative process. In places such as Afghanistan 
where warlords can also be illiterate, the extent of the challenge becomes 
extremely clear. Alternatively, their interests and goals may not be well-iden-
tified or properly addressed in agreements, undermining their commitment 
to implementation (Dudouet 2009). Thus an agreement which emphasises 
national power-sharing where a group has sought greater local autonomy 
might offer the right general incentive – political governance – but in the 
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wrong form. Alternatively, groups which were not included may become 
more vocal.  
Finally, where the commitment of external actors to monitoring, or en-
forcing, peace agreements is weak, or perceived by one or more parties to be 
weak, this will affect the viability of these arrangements. Recent work has 
highlighted the importance of third-party credibility in determining the suc-
cess or failure of troop deployment in peacekeeping situations. This is all the 
more important, it is argued, because peacekeepers succeed if they can sus-
tain a deterrent posture: forcing the protagonists not to resort to weapons 
without having to fire a single shot in the process (Martin-Brûlé 2008). In 
some instances external actors may actively seek to undermine arrange-
ments, or, through their own instability, passively undermine arrangements. 
While most research on external actors takes the United Nations as its point 
of reference, one should not forget that outsiders are involved either directly 
or indirectly in many of the world’s internal conflicts. The involvement of 
third-parties in what has become known as internationalised civil wars does 
not stop, nor should it be expected to, with the signing of a peace agree-
ment. Of course, in many contexts it will be the interaction of these factors 
that create serious challenges.  
Our development of these three factors as an analytic device is based 
on inductive reasoning, as we are interested in theory development, and 
future research may help to refine or indeed challenge the salience of each. 
However, initial observations across a wide range of cases suggest that the 
constellation of these three factors creates a range of challenges for negotia-
tion and implementation of peace agreements relying upon power-sharing. 
These contextual factors intersect with the limitations of each of the four 
types of power-sharing in complex ways which are illustrated in our discus-
sions of negotiation and implementation below. We turn first to the short-
term challenges in negotiation and then implementation, and then to the 
difficulty of creating sustainable states with something more than a negative 
peace. 
Power-Sharing: Short-Term Satisficing Solution or 
Long-Term Plan for Sustainable State-Building? 
For practitioners involved in negotiating power-sharing agreements, these 
arrangements are designed to achieve a set of immediate security demands in 
the short-term, and are seldom designed to create sustainable, strong states. 
They are, in a sense, satisficing approaches. The goal is that of negative 
peace – halting current fighting and limiting the risks of its return. That, 
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however, is not the view espoused by many analysts of power-sharing, espe-
cially its consociational variant, who see such arrangements as the starting 
point for not only lasting peace but democratic sustainability (Taylor 2009). 
Notwithstanding the potential utility of power-sharing arrangements in the 
short term, it is essential to understand their impact on post-conflict states 
in the longer term. The effects of power-sharing are not as uniformly posi-
tive as enthusiasts, who market the consociational experience of Northern 
Ireland as “best practice” and see it as a template for ending conflicts and 
bringing about democracy, contend (McGarry and O’Leary 1998, 2004). 
They may not only fail to create stronger, democratic, sustainable states, but 
embed arrangements which make achieving such states far more difficult. 
While it is clearly right that those negotiating power-sharing arrangements 
are concerned primarily with conflict mitigation and termination, not state-
building, it is critical that they understand the potential unintended conse-
quences of the short-term bargains they support for longer-term state 
structures. However, we contend that even the short-term goals of power-
sharing may prove difficult to achieve, first because agreement may prove 
difficult to reach and even more difficult to implement. In the following 
sections, we turn first to the limits of power-sharing in the short to medium 
term before addressing its longer term consequences. 
Limits in the Short Term: Challenges of Negotiation and 
Immediate Implementation 
Challenges of Negotiation 
Negotiating peace agreements of any sort is clearly difficult, given that par-
ties will have very different interests and agendas, and understandings about 
why armed conflict was waged and what might constitute a just solution, as 
well as their mistrust of one another and security fears. Therefore, in a gen-
eral sense, the challenges of negotiating peace agreements with power-shar-
ing incentives are not necessarily greater than negotiating ones without 
them. However, we do identify here the particular ways in which power-
sharing incentives may be difficult to negotiate. While power-sharing incen-
tives may logically offer a way out of the security dilemma faced by armed 
groups, mistrust among them may result in fear of disarming. This is par-
ticularly likely to be the case where one group is left in a privileged position, 
as the SPLM (Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement) was by the CPA 
(Comprehensive Peace Agreement), in relation to all other armed groups in 
the South of Sudan, which were to be disarmed while the SPLM became the 
government and sole security provider in the South (Sriram 2008: 107-142). 
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Governments may also be unprepared to offer such incentives, believing 
either that armed groups will use the negotiation or cease-fire period to 
rearm, or that, once empowered with such access to governance, the groups 
will harm those currently in power or the state itself. Here the nature of the 
state and of the armed group may combine to limit options. 
Furthermore, such incentives may foster trust only if a third-party guar-
antee is also present. The negotiation of Sudan’s CPA was arguably bolstered 
by the presence of strong regional mediators and the prospect of a United 
Nations peacekeeping force, while the limited participation in the Darfur 
negotiations may reflect the poor prospect for a robust international force 
there.3 In Mozambique and Angola, active international involvement in 
negotiations was clearly a factor in explaining the timing of the Rome 
Agreement and the Bicesse Accords respectively. Likewise, analysts have 
made much of the difference in the robustness of UNAVEM I (the first 
United Nations Angola Verification Mission) and UNOMOZ (United Na-
tions Operation in Mozambique) to explain the failure of the Angolan peace 
process and the success of its Mozambican counterpart. And in Nepal, the 
presence of the relatively weak UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) 
was less of a robust deterrent. While we as analysts or advocates might wish 
that a third-party guarantor always be available, we know that often it is not.  
It may also simply be the case that the wrong incentives are being of-
fered. For example, some groups value territorial autonomy and governance 
of resources, but have no particular interest in governing at the national 
level. These groups might not be interested in signing an agreement that 
offers them, say, participation in national security forces or in parliament. In 
Sudan, the SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army) had the 
most clearly articulated demands for power- and resource-sharing, and ter-
ritorial autonomy. It had less apparent interest in inclusion in security forces, 
which is at odds with future autonomy, so perhaps it should be no surprise 
that the creation of joint integrated units has been halting, at best (Sriram 
2008: 107-142). Where the nature, capacities, and interests of the group are 
not fully taken into account, negotiations will clearly be hampered. 
It may be the case that these incentives alone are not enough to con-
vince armed groups to sign any peace agreement: they will insist that some 
of their original demands, those that drove them to take up arms, be met as 
well. Where incentives such as autonomy are part of their original demands, 
this may facilitate agreement. The SPLM/A’s platform had for some time 
alternately included fundamental change in the national government and 
                                                 
3  There has yet to be a comprehensive peace agreement encompassing all key parties 
to the conflict in Darfur. 
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regional independence; it achieved the first at least formally, and the pros-
pect of the second through a referendum in the CPA (Sriram 2008: 107-
142). The failure to acknowledge key demands or interests of a group may 
make agreement less likely. 
Finally, these incentives can seldom eliminate the “spoiler problem”, 
and may actually help to create opposition to the peace process, or at least 
consolidate the opposition of groups that were previously positive or neutral 
towards it. Peace agreements can seldom be comprehensive, and opposition 
groups, armed or otherwise, as well as government hard-liners, may oppose 
peace agreements that exclude them or that they feel give away too much. 
Disenfranchised groups may even take up arms if they see agreements pro-
gressing that appear to exclude them and divide the pie of power and re-
sources in a permanent fashion. Thus, the completion of the CPA in Sudan 
heightened demands for similar incentives by rebel groups in the East and 
Darfur (Sriram 2008: 107-142). A similar pattern appears to have emerged in 
the Terai region of Nepal.4 And, of course, the Arusha Accords were, ana-
lysts argue, directly responsible for fostering Hutu extremism in Rwanda 
(Paris 2004: 70-71). Agreements might then fail not simply because they 
haven’t acknowledged the nature or demands of existing armed groups, but 
also haven’t recognised potential demands of excluded populations with the 
capability to become organised groups and challenge any agreement. 
Challenges of Implementation 
As with the challenges of negotiating power-sharing arrangements, imple-
menting power-sharing arrangements is not necessarily more difficult than 
implementing other types of peace deals. Indeed, while experts disagree on 
the precise statistics, a significant percentage of negotiated settlements fail 
within five years. However, there are specific types of challenges which are 
specific to the implementation of power-sharing arrangements, which we 
illustrate here. One or more parties may sign an agreement but easily violate 
it, either because the incentives were not important to it/them, or because 
they can achieve key goals through violence. An example is the 1999 Lomé 
Accord in Sierra Leone, which provided the RUF (Revolutionary United 
Front) leadership with access to control over resources, directly and indi-
rectly. Not only was Foday Sankoh made a vice president and a minister 
with control over diamond mines, but fellow RUF leader Johnny Paul 
                                                 
4  The Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the United Democratic Madhesi Front 
(28 February 2008), online: <http://www.unmin.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-
02-28-Agreement.SPA.Govt.UDMF.ENG.pdf>, was negotiated to address the de-
mands of one key group.  
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Koroma was also made the head of the government commission for peace 
consolidation, and provisions were made for the incorporation of some 
RUF members into the state security forces. Yet, as we know, the RUF 
rapidly returned to fighting – control over diamonds was an insufficient 
incentive, as the RUF already had attained de facto control over many mines. 
And evidently, broader political rule was not of significant interest to the 
RUF either. In Zimbabwe, in spite of the power-sharing deal between the 
ruling ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front) and 
the opposition MDC (Movement for Democratic Change), senior ZANU-
PF officials have baulked against the deal and worked to undermine it using 
violent and non-violent means, including the arrest of MDC ministerial 
nominees and the detention, and torture, of human rights activists and 
MDC sympathisers. According to some analysts, resistance to the deal 
within ZANU-PF is partially due to the fact that power-sharing threatens 
economic benefits that senior officials within the party have secured from 
their hold onto power.5 Likewise, it became apparent in 1992 that UNITA 
(União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) leader Jonas 
Savimbi would not settle for anything less than the presidency of Angola 
when his failure to achieve this objective in the first post-conflict electoral 
contest resulted in his decision to revoke his commitment to the terms of 
the Bicesse Accords. This illustrates how the nature, interests, and capacities 
of the state or of the armed group may affect the success of implementation. 
Parties may sign an agreement involving incentives that are of lesser 
interest to them, or that they are unable to partake of adequately. This will 
particularly be the case where armed groups are not structurally prepared to 
participate in governance activities. In Sudan, for example, many suggest 
that the SPLM really was interested in the possibility of complete independ-
ence, interim autonomy, resources, and autonomous security forces. The 
CPA gave it all of these things, as well as proportional participation in the 
central government, and in joint security forces. But many in the SPLM/A 
resist the idea of participating in joint security forces and being redeployed 
outside what they expect to be their own country in the future. Many of the 
SPLM members who have taken up posts as heads of government ministries 
appear to have been unprepared for their roles, or are unable to actually 
direct embedded bureaucracies (Sriram 2008: 107-142). In Colombia, when 
the rebel group M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril) disarmed and formed a 
                                                 
5  Zimbabwe’s Power Sharing Government: The Struggle Goes On, The Economist, 4 
June 2009, online: <http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaySto 
ry.cfm?story_id=13788284>; see also, Alex Perry and Simba Rushwaya, Mugabe 
Pushes Back Against Zimbabwe Power Sharing Deal, Time, 7 October 2008, online: 
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1847979,00.html>.  
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political party, it was considered unusually prepared, as a group led by many 
urban educated people, to function in politics. Yet while a few individual 
politicians were able to thrive, the party failed, an object lesson to future 
groups considering negotiation and disarmament (Sriram 2008: 143-180). 
The nature, interests, and capacities of an armed group may affect the vi-
ability of many provisions designed to include them in governance. In such 
instances, the asymmetry in capacities between the state and its power-shar-
ing partners, as well as its interest, or lack thereof, in ensuring the smooth 
functioning of power-sharing will play a crucial role in the success and/or 
failure of the power-sharing experiment. 
Furthermore, old patterns of mistrust and cheating are sometimes sim-
ply transported into institutions of governance, new and old. In Côte 
d’Ivoire, the Marcoussis power-sharing agreement did little to overcome 
mistrust between southern and northern political leaders. The former per-
ceived it as  
“a French-mediated sellout to terrorism, while northern leaders claim 
that [Prime Minister Laurent] Gbagbo reneged on private and public 
promises he made regarding the powers to be exercised by the Prime 
Minister and appointments to the cabinet” (Rothchild 2008: 143).  
In Sudan, many of the institutions developed by the peace agreement to 
ensure implementation of specific governance incentives – the petroleum 
commission, the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) 
commissions, and the like – have not been created, or have been highly 
dysfunctional. Furthermore, when SPLM members were placed at the head 
of key ministries, many of the functions of those ministries were first trans-
ferred to presidency, which was dominated by the NCP (National Congress 
Party) and the old government. Such cheating and manipulation of institu-
tional structures can increase mistrust and, where it is severe, provoke a 
revival of tensions or even conflict. Nascent state institutions may be unable 
to manage conflict, or conflict may be managed in repressive ways. The 
result could be the collapse of a peace agreement, the failure of state institu-
tions, or a more violent resolution of disputes. The nature of the state, either 
due to strength and resistance to accommodating new participants, or due to 
the weakness of institutions, may thus compound the effects of the previous 
challenge, where state institutions resist accommodation and groups are not 
well equipped to challenge them or fully function within them. 
Power-sharing may also fail to create a grand coalition and instead cre-
ate incentives for extremism and ethnic or political hard-liner outbidding. 
Centrist parties may be pulled to one extreme and find themselves able to 
reach or maintain power only by forming coalitions with extremist parties, 
or by taking more extreme stands themselves. The Arusha Accords which 
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distributed power in cabinet equally between Rwandan President Juvénal 
Habyarimana’s MRND (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le 
Développement) and the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) were perceived so 
negatively by Hutu extremists that Habyarimana was forced to pursue what 
Alan Kuperman described as a two-track strategy: seeking to coopt Hutu 
moderates while working to develop a forceful option with extremists 
(Rothchild 2008: 253). Likewise, in the Sudan, parties organising for the 
upcoming parliamentary elections to be held in 2010 have clustered in loose 
coalitions. A closer look at the coalitions headed by the NCP and the SPLM 
– coalitions that are necessary if these parties are to win a majority of votes 
nationally for the NCP and in the South for the SPLM – indicates that the 
smaller parties tend to hold more extremist views. For example, the NCP is 
often outflanked on religious issues by its partner the PCP (Popular Con-
gress Party). Smaller parties in the South, particularly those that are not cur-
rently represented in government or in parliament, tend to make more ex-
tremist demands in pursuit of their objectives.6 The nature of both state 
elite groups and armed groups may thus have a devastating effect on poli-
tics. 
nt in develop-
ing i
                                                
Territorial power-sharing arrangements may encourage secessionist 
tendencies and the breakup of the state. Alternatively, such strategies may 
encourage the homogenisation of populations. Where preconflict popula-
tions were mixed and were displaced into new largely single-identity com-
munities by conflict, they may not remix after the conflict, or may do so 
very slowly; if internal borders are made more significant, people may not 
return to areas they previously inhabited, which may have been more plural. 
Or population shifts may be more coerced, with groups compelled out of 
fear to migrate to regions identified as belonging to “their” group. Further-
more, autonomous territories may not be sustainable without serious re-
source commitments from the central government or the international 
community. Obviously, central governments, which are likely to be domi-
nated by a group that is ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct from 
the majority of the autonomous region, may not be committed to support-
ing that autonomy financially. This may promote, not the breakup of the 
state, but simply the failure of autonomy arrangements. Some analysts sug-
gest that this explains the breakdown of Sudan’s 1972 Addis Ababa Agree-
ment; conversely, the presence of oil and the development of oil extraction 
in Southern Sudan today could, in theory, assist its governme
ts own capacity over time (Atlas and Licklider 1999: 50). 
 
6  Source removed for purposes of anonymity.  
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Power-sharing arrangements are unlikely to be sustainable where parties 
have committed themselves to power-sharing arrangements out of short-
term pragmatism rather than as part of long-term policy. If they see govern-
ance arrangements as mere tools to achieve power through nonviolent 
means, they may be unlikely to comply with the agreement if they feel the 
strategy is failing – for example, because an adversary is likely to do better 
outside elections. Thus, in Liberia, the leaders of the LURD (Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy) and of MODEL (Movement for 
Democracy and Elections in Liberia) resisted the disarmament of their mili-
tias although they were members of the transitional cabinet. This reluctance 
was partially attributed to their desire to “keep their militias intact should 
their services be required again by their respective sponsors in Guinea and 
Côte d’Ivoire” (Africa Confidential 2003 cited in Rothchild 2008: 153). This 
may particularly be the case if power-sharing is viewed as imported or exter-
nally imposed, as was arguably the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Where poli-
tics is historically clientelistic, corrupt, personalistic, or absolutist, parties 
committing themselves to democratisation and power-sharing may do so for 
cynical or short-term ends, and will eventually seek to obtain absolute 
pow
Belt region. Here it is less the nature and interests of 
grou
er. Again, the nature and interests of state and/or armed group(s) will 
shape prospects for implementation of agreements. 
Power-sharing arrangements run the risk of the creation of new con-
flicts, or the stoking of existing conflicts, when they exclude significant par-
ties or interests. The pragmatic choice to include only warring parties, or 
only powerful parties, at the negotiating table spawns potential new spoilers. 
The CPA in Sudan appears to have incited groups in the east and Darfur to 
use violence to get their demands heard regarding land, resources, and dis-
crimination, out of concern that the north, under the peace agreement, will 
divide the power and resources of the country while keeping them margin-
alised. In 1966, the Nigerian military government sought to placate minori-
ties in the secessionist region of Biafra and elsewhere by dividing the coun-
try into twelve states. This ushered in a process of conflict-management by 
territorial fragmentation. In 1979, the amended Nigerian Constitution intro-
duced the notion of “indigeneity” to refer to those citizens of a Nigerian 
state whose parents or grandparents historically originated from a commu-
nity within that state. Indigeneity has since become the source of new and 
increasingly violent local conflicts between “indigenes” and “settlers”, par-
ticularly in the Middle 
ps included in the agreement than of those excluded that may shape the 
fate of the agreement. 
After an agreement, violence may erupt not among former enemies but 
among former allies. This is not a problem unique to power-sharing ar-
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rangements, but may well emerge in them. Peace agreements generally seek 
to address the grievances that initiated the original conflict, and power-
sharing seeks to address the fears and demands of the original combatants in 
relation to each other. However, in either a former government or a former 
rebel group, one or more factions may be privileged over others in the divi-
sion of the “spoils” of peace. If this is the case, fighting and factional divi-
sions among former allies, or rifts within groups, may result (Atlas and Lick-
lider 1999: 35-54). Groups, whether state elites or armed groups which were 
held
ments. Here it 
is not just the commitment (or lack of it) by external actors to the agreement 
 transition 
 together in conflict while in fact rather diverse in a range of ways, may 
splinter if an agreement is tailored which fails to take account of this.  
Finally, implementation of power-sharing may be difficult if not impos-
sible in “bad neighbourhoods”. Neighbouring states may foster or destabi-
lise power-sharing in multiple ways. Neutrality has often been invoked to ex-
plain the success of the Swiss experiment; likewise, the intrusions of Syria 
and Israel into the internal politics of Lebanon have been partially blamed 
for the instability of its power-sharing experiment (Zahar 2005). When geo-
strategic interests or ethnic kinship considerations draw neighbouring states 
into the politics of a power-sharing state, they might destabilise the internal 
pacts. Thus scholars have pointed to the destabilising role of neighbouring 
states and refugee flows in Rwanda, on power-sharing arrange
that matters; some external actors may actively undermine it. 
Limits in the Longer Term: Building Sustainable and/or 
Democratic States 
Power-sharing is thus a set of arrangements that seek to create “good 
enough” arrangements in the short-term to enable war to peace transitions, 
but which may, as we have seen, face significant challenges even in this. A 
greater problem arises as we expand our time horizon, or broaden our ex-
pectations about what kind of peace, and what kind of state, are being built. 
To some, this might look like unfair criticism, holding power-sharing to 
such exacting standards that it cannot but fail. However, there are serious 
concerns in the academic and policy communities for the sustainability of 
peace agreements. And most of the recent peace agreements that have been 
negotiated under international auspices have included one or more dimen-
sions of power-sharing. In the following section, we argue that power-shar-
ing agreements, even whilst deemed successful in ushering in a
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communities in their midst (Murshed 2008), then concerns for 
the l
e Democratic Republic of the Congo. This has facilitated the rise 
                                                
 war to peace,7 run the risk of creating states unable to effectively re-
spond to governance challenges that they may face in the future. 
At least two features are commonly expected in post-conflict states by 
those who seek to assist them. The first might be considered a more sustain-
able peace – the ability of the institutions of state to withstand challenges 
and crises and manage the potential for violence in a peaceful, constitutional 
fashion. This will entail strong institutions capable of convincing those with 
grievances that resorting to violence would be counterproductive and pun-
ished by the state. The second expectation is that of a more positive peace, 
and often one that entails, if not a democratic state, one that is relatively 
representative of, and responsive to the needs of, the whole population of 
tate (Jarstad 2008). This entails a state capable of convincing those with 
grievances that their concerns will be addressed in a non-violent manner. 
The creation of a robust state capable of containing resorts to violence, 
and a responsive, non-violent state, are broader goals of peacebuilders, but 
are not goals explicitly built into power-sharing arrangements. Nor are they 
foremost in the minds of researchers as they evaluate the success or failure 
of power-sharing schemes. Yet, if we are to take seriously the findings of 
research that suggest that state policies are the prime predictor of violent 
conflict8 and that fragile and/or non-democratic states are more likely to 
resort to either repressive or discriminatory policies in dealing with the 
grievances of 
ong-term consequences of power-sharing should be front and centre in 
our analyses. 
Beyond simple stability, for some the goal of peacebuilding and state-
building should go further, creating democratic sustainability. What does 
democratic sustainability entail and how can one think about this in relation 
to power-sharing? Democratic sustainability can be thought of as the right 
balance between deterrence and assurance. States need to be able to deter 
potential rebels in their midst. Unless a state is able to wield an effective 
monopoly over the use of violence, it will not be able to deter potential re-
bels. And, as Herbst has argued, African leaders face a peculiar set of prob-
lems related to patterns of demographic settlement, geography and ecology 
when considering the cost of expanding their domestic power infrastructure 
(Herbst 2000: 11-13). The central state has often been much more visible in 
and around the capital than in the hinterlands, as has been the case in, for 
example, th
 
7  Most analysts define success as the ability to avoid a relapse into violent conflict in 
the five years following the signing of a peace agreement. 
8  This is the main finding of the Minorities at Risk project at the University of Mary-
land. See generally <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/>.  
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ho hold grievances 
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med rebellion, often supported politically and financially by neighbour-
ing states.  
But deterring rebellion is but one side of the democratic sustainability 
coin. The state also needs to assure groups in its midst that it will give a fair 
hearing to their grievances and that it will not use its military might abusively 
against them. Indeed, assurance is an essential part of a successful deterrence 
strategy. Decision-makers must thus tread carefully as they rebuild security 
institutions, for fear that these will be perceived as a threat and thus spur 
counter-reactions amongst those groups in society w
st the state. They must also work to provide other outlets for the ex-
pression and management of grievances and conflicts.  
A further precondition for successful assurance and deterrence is the 
basic ability of the state to function. This harkens back to Weber’s discus-
sion of the bureaucratic state and of the legitimacy derived from the basic 
ability to administer. A dysfunctional state, unable to provide basic services 
to its population, supporters and opponents alike, is likely to lose all credi-
bility in the eyes of its population. As discussed earlier in this article, credi-
bility is a cornerstone of deterrence. It is also intimately tied to perceptions 
of state legitimacy as recent research by Susan Woodward has dem
odward forthcoming 2010). Thus, the basic ability of states to function 
is equally important for the state’s ability to both deter and assure. 
Beyond functioning and service provision, the sustainability of the state 
may depend on a distinct element of legitimacy – the perception within a 
significant portion of the population that the state operates according to a 
clear set of rules and principles of fairness and transparency. This depends 
upon the presence of rule of law, whereby the rules of the road are set forth 
in a process which is previously defined, by individuals chosen according to 
an agreed process (Hart 1961). This need not be a democratic rule of law, 
although democracies most frequently operate according to such principles. 
Socio-legal scholars have found that citizens are far more prepared to accept 
government edicts and laws, even ones with which they disagree, if they 
conceive them to have been reached through a fair process (Tyler 2006). In 
societies emerging from conflict the real and perceived presence of the rule 
of law is now viewed as critical by the United Nations (United Nations 
2004; Sriram, Martin-Ortega and Herman 2010). However, power-sharing 
arrangements, by inserting persons into various levels of governanc
eir former coercive roles, may create institutional structures incapable 
of winning public confidence and securing longer-term legitimacy. 
The delicate balance between deterrence and assurance is particularly 
difficult to achieve in those African situations where the state itself remains 
rather strong, but prone to discrimination and repression, as in Sudan and 
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Angola. In Angola, and in spite of the Bicesse Accords which called for the 
merger of the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) and 
UNITA’s forces into the FAA (Forças Armadas de Angola, the new Ango-
lan armed forces), neither party was really interested in integration, hoping 
to ultimately prevail militarily. And when the two protagonists signed the 
Luena memorandum, following the death of Jonas Savimbi and the military 
defeat of UNITA at the hands of the MPLA, all that the rebel group could 
get were “promises that existing integration provisions would be imple-
mented” (Brown and Zahar 2008: 80). The problem is not limited to those 
states that appear strong because of their military capabilities and/or their 
willingness to use force to quash dissent. It is also evident in other cases 
where strength is less a function of military might and more a function of 
one party’s effective control of, or near monopoly over, sensitive state in-
stitutions. In Mozambique, which is commonly referred to as a success 
story, the state’s deterrent capability remains a sensitive issue. Mozambican 
politicians and analysts agree that RENAMO’s (Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana) influence in the security sector, which was guaranteed in the 
Rome Agreement under provisions for security power-sharing, is being 
eroded by the ruling FRELIMO (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique) 
party (Brown and Zahar 2008: 81). While it is too early to speculate on more 
recent cases, there are signs that similar difficulties can be expected in lo-
cales such as the Sudan and Zimbabwe. Based on the experience of these 
two countries to date, there are equally concerns that, should the state re-
nege on its commitments and attempt to use violence against its opponents, 
the international community’s willingness to intervene may be extremely 
limited.  
Deterrence without assurance may thus result in deepened authoritari-
anism of the sort likely to foster grievances and ultimately result in renewed 
violence. Likewise, assurances without a concomitant deterrent capability 
raise a different set of concerns about the sustainability of peace. Indeed, 
where the state’s deterrent capability has not been rebuilt, the ability to 
maintain gains achieved in the political sphere depends in great part on the 
stability of the regional environment and/or the commitment of external 
actors to shield the country from destabilising influences. Such, for example, 
is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where the 2002 
peace agreement has survived against all odds. While progress in the political 
sphere includes the holding of the first post-war elections in 2006, the DDR 
programme, while it achieved some of its objectives, did not result in the 
creation of an integrated Congolese army capable of standing on its own. In-
deed, the exclusion of armed groups in the Ituri region and the inability to 
secure the demobilisation of Rwandan armed groups operating on DRC 
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territory raise concerns about the ability of the country to weather armed 
challenges if and when the MONUC (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations 
Unies en République démocratique du Congo) withdraws. The experience of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where recent developments have raised the re-
newed spectre of violence, should the EUFOR (European Union Force) 
withdraw, should serve as a warning. Indeed, the fourteen years since the 
Dayton Peace Agreement have seen many improvements in the country but 
thes
le inter-
national commitment to African countries threatened with the collapse of 
structures might be more difficult to summon. 
 war-torn states and societies. In terms of policy implica-
tions
e were not sufficient to ward off the risk of destabilisation caused, in 
part, by the weakness of the central state’s deterrent capability (Zahar 2009).  
Finally, analysts and practitioners should also worry about the debili-
tating effects of power-sharing where the challenges of negotiation and im-
plementation outlined earlier weaken further already fragile post-conflict 
states, leaving them without the ability to deter or the capacity and/or will-
ingness to assure. Often functioning without appropriate resources and with 
little or no external protection, these fragile post-conflict countries run the 
risk of being buffeted by instability stemming from inside and outside their 
borders. Still in the throes of conflict and while no power-sharing agreement 
is under consideration to bring it out of war, Somalia stands as the best 
warning of the fate that such countries may encounter. Further away, in the 
Middle East, Lebanon stands as another omen of what can befall countries 
that fail to reassure and deter simultaneously; a country that had rebuilt itself 
over fifteen years before seeing most of its accomplishments wiped out in 
six weeks of regional war followed by four years of intense political crisis 
which brought the country to the brink of renewed civil war (Zahar 2009). 
But although Lebanon’s geographic position bordering Syria and Israel has 
prompted Western countries to intervene and commit 15,000 troops to give 
new life to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon as well as financial 
and political support to revive the fledgling state institutions, credib
their power-sharing 
Conclusions 
This cursory review of the short- and longer-term challenges of power-
sharing has implications for both theory and policy. It was not designed as a 
comprehensive review of all power-sharing arrangements, but as an exercise 
in inductive theory-development to underpin future research. Theoretically, 
it obliges researchers to ask new questions about the assumptions underlying 
attempts to rebuild
, there are specific areas of concern to which practitioners ought to pay 
greater attention.  
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First, the inclusion of power-sharing arrangements in peace deals is 
premised on a belief that the problems (and the solution to these problems) 
lie in the institutional framework of the state, that it is sufficient to build 
states properly to ward off renewed violence and (hopefully) entrench de-
mocratic practices. This does not sufficiently acknowledge two important 
caveats: that groups within and outside the state may have interests that are 
not addressed by the power-sharing institutions and/or have reasons to 
continue fearing threats that cannot be simply addressed by institutional 
tinkering. This theoretical conclusion dovetails nicely with recent research 
that has raised questions about the adequacy of power-sharing, indeed more 
generally about the enterprise of international involvement in the recon-
struction of post-conflict states. It also goes a long way to explain one of 
our empirical findings: that much depends on the nature of the groups, 
understood not so much as their capacity to spoil, but on a deeper level that 
capt
se; rather they discuss service 
ures their social basis, their interests and their ability to effectively repre-
sent and pursue both. 
Second, power-sharing illustrates a paradox in the process of post-con-
flict reconstruction as in many, if not the majority of, instances, the state is 
both identified as the problem and the solution. States are the main source 
of threat to groups in their midst. Indeed, quantitative research on state 
violence suggests that state violence is not only more prevalent but more 
lethal than the violence meted out by rebel groups (Armstrong and Daven-
port 2008). Can states be reconstructed in ways that limit their repressive 
capacities? And, if so, is power-sharing the way to go? Much, as we have 
argued above, depends on the nature, capacities, and interests of the state 
and of the groups which agreements seek to include in governance. In other 
words, the extent of the transformation required to ensure a sustainable 
transition from war to peace and from violent to non-violent conflict man-
agement will greatly vary depending on starting conditions, something that 
current approaches, which have been criticised for adopting a cookie-cutter 
formula, do not sufficiently acknowledge. Much also depends on the man-
ner in which power-sharing arrangements, and the risks associated with 
them, end up affecting the basic ability of states to provide services. Beyond 
its ability to deter the use of violence in its midst and/or its capacity to as-
sure citizens of its own restraint, a state is a set of institutions of governance 
that is supposed to provide, at a minimum, a basic framework for the rule of 
law, as well as for the provision of those basic services without which the 
most fundamental requirements of human security are at risk. However, to 
date, most discussions of the success or failure of power-sharing arrange-
ments do not take such considerations into account. The few notable ex-
ceptions do not address power-sharing per 
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prov
iscursive 
changes in the international community’s commitment to stay the course in 
tries, especially in countries such as Afghanistan. 
Arm
an and Marie-Joëlle Zahar (eds.), Intra-State Conflict, 
Atlas, Pierre M. and Roy Licklider (1999), Conflict Among Former Allies 
-54. 
Brow  
Guarantees and Alternative Approaches to Power Sharing in Angola 
and Mozambique, in: Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 4, 2, 75-88. 
ision in the more general context of the success or failure of peace 
agreements (Woodward forthcoming 2010). 
Third, power-sharing arrangements may be appealing options for me-
diators, but often fail to do what they purport to do, which is provide greater 
security for the people. Even where they do provide stability at the national 
level, they are unlikely to address local-level violence sufficiently (Mehler 
2008). Others have also argued that real human security can only be achieved 
through democratic practices and that power-sharing thwarts deep democrati-
sation (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Others still have argued that post-conflict 
reconstruction requires both top-down and bottom-up approaches if peace is 
to be entrenched (Lederach 1995, 1997). In other words, the discursive argu-
ments often used to justify foreign intervention in post-conflict reconstruc-
tion – the so-called drive to humanitarian intervention – stand in stark op-
position to the short- to medium-term empirical results of the institutional 
policies favoured by outside interveners. While some have argued that these 
policies are driven by the international community’s obsession with exit 
strategies, the fact remains that some learning has occurred on this front. 
The most obvious change has occurred in the electoral realm, with the ear-
lier obsession with “speedy” post-conflict elections replaced by a growing 
realisation that such elections cannot be successfully held, nor can they 
achieve their intended objectives, if some minimal conditions are not met. 
And while it is too early to pass judgement, there are at least d
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Die Gefahren der Machtteilung – in Afrika und darüber hinaus 
Zusammenfassung: Ziel internationaler Bemühungen zur Konfliktlösung 
ist es auf kurze Sicht, gewaltsame bewaffnete Konflikte zu beenden, auf 
mittlere oder lange Sicht, das Wiederaufleben von Konflikten zu verhindern. 
Zumindest ein Mittel, das häufig in Konfliktlösungs- und Friedensabkom-
men eingesetzt wird, die Machtteilung, kann sich allerdings im frühen 
Verhandlungs- und Umsetzungsstadium als problematisch erweisen und 
dem langfristigen Ziel, das Wiederaufflammen des Konflikts zu verhüten, 
entgegenstehen. Warum ist dies möglicherweise der Fall? Langfristige Frie-
denssicherung sucht Konflikte durch einen starken und zukunftsfähigen 
Staat zu verhindern; ein solcher Staat wäre in der Lage, bewaffnete Konflikte 
dadurch zu verhüten, dass er auf Beschwerden reagiert und gewaltsame 
Auseinandersetzungen effizient eindämmt. Machtteilungsvereinbarungen 
können diese Bemühungen jedoch unterminieren, indem sie Personen und 
Gruppierungen Macht verschaffen, die sich einer Regierungsführung zum 
Wohl der gesamten Bevölkerung nicht verpflichtet fühlen oder nicht dazu in 
der Lage sind, denn in solchen Vereinbarungen werden gerade solchen 
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Gruppierungen Machtpositionen zugesichert, die beträchtliche Gewalt zur 
Erreichung ihrer Ziele angewandt haben. Damit wird es nach Ansicht der 
Autorinnen weniger wahrscheinlich, dass demokratische Staaten entstehen – 
auch wenn sie Demokratie nicht als das einzige legitime Ziel von Friedens-
vereinbarungen ansehen. Sie gehen davon aus, dass Machtteilungsvereinba-
rungen nicht nur zu undemokratischen Staaten führen können, sondern zu 
Staaten, die sich den Sicherheitsbedürfnissen der Bevölkerung gegenüber 
verschließen, sodass sichere Lebensbedingungen und staatliche Legitimität 
ausgehöhlt werden. 
Schlagwörter: Afrika; Machtteilung; Konfliktlösung; Peacebuilding; Streit-
kräfte/militärische Verbände 
 
 
